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NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW

CRIMINAL LAW-THE NEED FOR A NEW CONCEPTION
OF INSANITY AS A DEFENSE TO A CRIME IN NEBRASKA
... at a day not far remote the teachings of biochemists and
behaviorists, of psychologists and penologists will transform our
whole system of punishment.t

In 1843 a man named M'Naghten, convinced he was being
persecuted, attempted to assassinate the Prime Minister of England and killed the Prime Minister's secretary in the attempt.
M'Naghten was acquitted by reason of insanity, but public uproar caused the House of Lords to make inquiry of the judges concerning the law of insanity. The most important answer to that
inquiry was that a sane man understands the nature and quality
of his acts or knows that they are wrong. 2
In 1955, over one hundred years later, a man named Thompson fired five shots at his wife in Omaha, Nebraska; and in reviewing his case, the Nebraska Supreme Court set down in its
opinion the M'Naghten formula as the only test of criminal responsibility recognized in t}:iis state.3 Though the application of
the M'Naghten test was not questioned by the plaintiff in error
in the Thompson case, the language of the court leaves little doubt
as to its adherence to the formula. 4 It is the purpose of this artiCardozo, Law and Literature 86 (1931).
M'Naghten's Case, 10 CL. & F. 200, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (H.L. 1843).
3 Thompson v. State, 159 Neb. 685, 68 N.W.2d 267 (1955); accord,
Linder v. State, t56 Neb. 504, 56 N.W.2d 734 (1953); Sedlacek v. Hann,
156 Neb. 340, 56 N.W.2d 138 (1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 974 (1953);
MacAvoy v. State, 144 Neb. 827, 15 N.W.2d 45 (1944), cert. denied,
323 U.S. 804 (1945); Kraus v. State, 108 Neb. 331, 187 N.W. 895 (1922).
An early Nebraska case tends to recognize the "irresistible impulse" test
though qualifying it within the M'Naghten rule. See Wright v. People, 4
Neb. 407 (1876). Contra: Fisher v. State, 154 Neb. 166, 47 N.W.2d
349 (1951).
4 One hundred and twelve years later the M'Naghten formula is the
sole test of criminal responsibility in 29 states; and in 17 others and in
military law it is still the main test supplemented by the irresistible impulse test. Weihofen, Insanity as a Defense in Criminal Law 66 (1933);
1
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cle to scrutinize the tests of insanity being used by other state
courts and to determine the advisability of the continued use of
the M'Naghten test in Nebraska.
I.

HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENTS OF THE TESTS OF INSANITY

In 1843 when the M'Naghten rule was established, society had
not yet completely repudiated the ancient concept that the mentally ill were possessed of demons and self-made victims of evil
passions. As late as March of 1862 the Lord Chancellor of England stated, "The introduction of medical opinions and medical
theories into this subject has proceeded upon the vicious principle
of considering insanity as a disease." 5 The reluctance of courts
to deviate from or repudiate the 1843 test creates glaring injustices in capital cases, wherein the accused falls within modern
concepts of mental illness but is guilty under the M'Naghten formula. "The memorials of our jurisprudence are written all over
with cases in which those who are now understood to have been
insane have been executed as criminals." 6
Advances of modern science have left the M'Naghten formula
eA."iremely vulnerable to attack. The basic objection to the formula
is that it simply does not fit the modern medical conceptions of
mind and body. 7 It is mired in the ancient concept of a compartmentized brain wherein reason, memory, love, and hate dwell securely in their own realms. Today, reason is looked upon as only
one of the many integrated, overlapping forces constantly reacting within the human brain to various stimuli. The M'Naghten
formula asks society to speculate as to whether, at the moment of
the act, one of these interwoven forces was engaged in evaluating
right and wrong. 8
Tulin, The Problem of l\lental Disorder in Crime: A Survey, 32 Col. L.
Rev. 933, 940 (1932); authorities coilected in Glueck, l\Iental Disorder
and the Criminal Law 227 (1925); Keedy, Irresistible Impulse as a Defense in Criminal Law, 100 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 956 (1952).
u As quoted in Parsons v. State, 81 Ala. 577, 583, 2 So. 854. 857 (1887).
6 Bishop. Criminal Law 287 (9th ed. 1923).
7 Report No. 26, Criminal Responsibility and Psychiatric Expert Testimony, Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry (l\lay 1954 l.
s In a vigorous dissent to one of the most exhaustive opinions on legal
tests for insanity in recent years, Chief Judge Biggs declared, "l\I'Naghten's
case ... assumed the existence of a logic-tight compartment in which the
delusion holds sway leaving the balance of the mind intact... (and) the
criminal retains enough logic in the tight compartment so that from this
sanctuary of reason he may inform himself as to what the other part of
his mind, the insane part, has compelled or permitted the body to do. If
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The glaring need for a complete revision of the concepts of
legal responsibility is pointed out most vividly in the recent case
of Durham v. United States.9 In that case the trial court rejected
the defense of insanity because it was not established that the
defendant "didn't know the difference between right and wrong,"
or that he was "subject to an irresistible impulse" ;10 and yet,
between 1945 and 1951, following his discharge from the Navy
for "a profound personality disorder," the defendant, after committing various crimes and attempting suicide, had been confined in a mental institution four times. The appeal court realistically asserted its prerogative, repudiated the archaic M'Naghten
rule, 11 and formulated a more scientific and retroactive test for
criminal responsibility.12 The test "is simply that an accused is
not criminally responsible if the unlawful act was the product of
mental disease or defect." 13 Yet, simple as the test may be, it
employs sufficient evidenciary safeguards insofar as it requires
two elements to perfect a defense of insanity. First, "some evidence of mental disorder" must be introduced to place the burden
of proving sanity beyond a reasonable doubt upon the prosecution, and second, there must be a causal connection between the
mental disease and the act.14 This test has long been effectively
used by the courts of New Hampshire which have concluded that
other tests only tend to confuse the jury.15
While it may be argued that juries of the past, using extensions of the "right and wrong" formula, have reached verdicts
similar to those now possible under the "Durham rule," 16 this is
the sane portion ... knows what the insane part compels or permits the
body to do is wrong, the body must suffer for it ... obliterating both the
good and bad portions as well as the residence of both." United States
v. Baldi, 192 F.2d 540, 567 (3d Cir. 1951). This analysis of M'Naghten's
rule was also stated in Holloway v. United States, 148 F.2d 665, 666
(D.C. Cir. 1945).
214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
Id. at 865.
11 See note 8 supra.
12 D.C. Code § 24-301 (1951).
13 Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862, 874 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
14 Id. at 866, 875.
lo State v. Jones, 50 N.H. 369, 393 (1871); State v. Pike, 49 N.H. 399
(1870).
16 Alabama, as early as 1887, because of "discoveries of modern psychological medicine," modified l\!'Naghten's rule adding a defense where.
"duress of mental disease" destroys "the power to choose between right
and wrong," and "the alleged crime was so connected with such mental
disease, in the relation of cause and effect, as to have been the product
9
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hardly a convincing argument against adoption of a new rule
which would make substantially certain the uniform rendition of
decisions which are more nearly in keeping with the advancement
of medical science. The "Durham test" does not exclude "right
and wrong" or "irresistible impulse" as factors; rather it adds
to these factors such relevant data as the presence of delusions,
I. Q., abilities, general comprehension, and menta1 history.
II.

EVIDENCIARY ASPECTS AND EXPERT OPINION UNDER
THE DURHAM TEST

Perhaps more important than the factors which are involved
in the Durham test is the added opportunity for scientific appraisal of all these factors in the light of modern psychiatric
knowledge. Under present tests the psychiatrist must relate his
medical data to the defendant's knowledge of right and wrong.17
His answer to the formalized question of right and wrong may
establish as legally sane a defendant whom, from his technical
insight and examination, the psychiatrist may know to be suffering from a mental condition which contributed to the crime. Under present procedure he is unable to relate or discuss information
which he feels is important to any determination of the defendant's criminal responsibility. Only in instances where the defendant suffers a disturbed consciousness or idiocy can the psychiatrist make honest replies to questions under the M'Naghten
formula. 18 Under the new test the jury is able to make e:;....-tensive
inquiry and the psychiatrist is able to testify upon any relevant
point and relate it to the defendant's mental state.19
III.

POLICY CONSIDERATIONS

There are increasing indications that if the gulf between psychiatric knowledge and legal tests for criminal insanity continues
or offspring of it solely." Parsons v. State, 81 Ala. 577, 2 So. 854 (1887).
"The jury must be satisfied that at the time of committing the act, the
accused, as a result of disease of the mind ... (a) did not know the nature and quality of the act, or (b) did not know that it was wrong, or
(c) was incapable of preventing himself from committing it." State v.
White, 58 N.l\f. 324, 270 P.2d 727 (1954).
17 In United States v. Baldi, 192 F.2d 540, 568 (3d Cir. 1951), the dissenting judges of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit observed that, "The law, when it required the psychiatrist to state
whether in his opinion the accused is capable of knowing right from
wrong, compels the psychiatrist to test guilt or innocence by a concept
which has almost no recognizable reality."
18 Report No. 26, op. cit. supra note 7, at 8.
19 Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d, 862, 872 (1954).
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to widen it will reach a point where such tests will violate the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal
Constitution. The Supreme Court has shown its dissatisfaction
with present tests by speaking in 1948 of "law which reflects the
most advanced scientific tests and law remaining a leaden footed
laggard."20 In 1952, the question was again before the Court to
decide the test's due process implications. It was then stated:
The science of psychiatry has made tremendous strides since that
test was laid down in M'Naghten's case, but the progress of science
has not reached a point where its learning would compel the
states to eliminate the Right and Wrong Test from their criminal
law.21

It appears, therefore, that the Court is growing impatient
with the disparity between definitions of insanity used by the
courts and the medical profession. In light of the substantial and
constant strides that are being made by psychiatry in the diagnosis and prognosis of human behavior, it is foreseeable that if
the various jurisdictions do not alter their present tests of insanity, the Court will prescribe a test which will meet the minimum requirements of the Due Process Clause.
IV.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE CRIMINAL INSANITY PROBLEM
IN NEBRASKA

In Nebraska progressive but inadequate statutes have been
enacted in an attempt to correct the injustices caused by the application of the obsolete M'Naghten formula. In many ways these
provisions are effective in mitigating the harsh exclusion of relevant mental data caused by application of M'Naghten's rule, but
they are at best a devious route.
A. Prior to Imprisonment
Nebraska law provides that one who becomes "lunatic or
insane" after the commission of any crime shall not be put on trial,
or if after conviction for any crime shall not be sentenced, or if
a capital sentence has been prescribed, execution shall not be imposed until the offender recovers. A commission is set up in
the latter case to determine the criminal's sanity.22 The test apFisher v. United States, 328 U.S. 463 (1946).
Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790 (1952). The majority held an Oregon
rule requiring the defendant to prove that he was insane at the time he
committed the crime beyond a reasonable doubt was not a violation of
the Fourteenth Amendment. Justice Frankfurter in the dissenting opinion
points out no change displacing a state's own choice would be justified at
"this stage of scientific knowledge ... no matter how backward (the present test) may be in the light of the best scientific cannons." (italics supplied).
22 Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 29-1822, 29-2509 (Reissue 1948).
20

21
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plied to the defendant under these statutes is whether "his state
of mind and mental condition are such that he does not understand, and is incapable of understanding the nature of the proceedings against him and of his impending fate and execution, and
therefore is unable, in a rational manner, to offer a defense or
make objection to execution."23 Mere imbecility or weakness of
mind is not enough.24 The term "insanity" as used in the state
includes "exhibiting unsoundess of mind; mad; deranged in mind;
delirious; distracted." 25 Though the clarity of the definition may
be disputed, the test of capability to understand, defend, and object makes it possible for the defendant to secure a hearing before competent medical experts.26 Thus it is possible for trial
or execution to be indefinitely postponed upon the basis of tests
less strict than M'Naghten's rule. It is to be noted, however,
that commitment under such circumstances could hardly be condusive to treatment of curable cases; nor does it serve the interest
of the state in restoring patients to useful citizen status.

B.

During Imprisonment

The Nebraska statutes provide that a mentally ill prisoner
can be transferred to a mental institution upon the recommendation of the prison physician and the concurrence of the Penitentiary Medical Board.2 ; There are more than thirty prisoners
at the Lincoln State Hospital who have been transferred under
this procedure.28 No accurate estimate may be given relative to
the number of psychotic immates now in Nebraska penal institutions; however, the state has a tenative plan to provide for 150
inmates in the "new maximum security" building to be built at
the Lincoln State Hospital. This building will house prisoners
from the state penal institutions who, because of mental illness,
have not been amenable to punishment. Since many of the mentally ill inmates never pose problems or create disturbances, they
may go unnoticed by the prison physician. In other cases, because
of crowded conditions of the state mental institutions, the con23ln re Grammer, 104 Neb. 744, 178 N.W. 624 (1920); In re Barker,
79 Neb. 361, 113 N.W. 197 (1907); Walker v. State, 46 Neb. 25, 64 N.W.
357 (1895).
24 Ibid; Witte v. Gilbert, 10 Neb. 539, 7 N.W. 288 (1880).
25 In re Grammer, 1·04 Neb. 744, 748, 178 N.W. 624, 626 (1920); Hawe
v. State, 11 Neb. 537, 538, 10 N.W. 452, 453 (1881).
26 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-2509 (Reissue 1948).
27 Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 83-358, 83-359 (Reissue 1950).
28 The author wishes to express his appreciation to Dr. F. L. Spradling.
Superintendent of the Lincoln State Hospital who gave generously of his
time to discuss this problem.
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currence of the State Penitentiary Medical Board is not always
forthcoming.
While it is recognized that these figures include mentally ill
inmates whose condition arose subsequent to imprisonment, it is
likewise possible that many of these inmates were within the Durham test at the time of trial. This conclusion is substantiated by
a study made at the Eastern State Penitentiary in Philadelphia
from 1931 to 1941 which disclosed that one out of every fortytwo felons sentenced there, was either mentally disordered to a
committable degree at the time of confinement or developed such
a condition while imprisoned. 29
Under the inadequate screening procedure existing in Nebraska, such men and women, upon completion of sentence, are
once more free in a society they are no more fit to cope with than
before.
C.

Collateral Problems

One further problem may be briefly considered. Many defendants, not faced with extreme punishment, decline to plead insanity because they prefer the statutory sentence instead of possible extended commitment to a mental hospital following an acquittal because of insanity.30 It is possible, therefore, for a defendant with a recorded background of mental illness, by not
pleading insanity, to secure a short prison sentence, rather than a
longer period of commitment in a mental institution. This is
directly contrary to the interests and intentions of the state and
society exemplified by the state statute which gives first priority
to room in state hospitals to " ... patients whose care in the state
hospital is necessary in order to protect the public health and
safety ..."31 This problem could be alleviated by setting up a
procedure such as the one followed in Massachusetts.32 Under the
Massachusetts procedure every person indicted by a grand jury
for a capital offense, or previously indicted for any other offense
more than once, or previously convicted of a felony is examined
by the state to determine his mental condition and the existence
of any mental disease or defect which would affect his criminal
responsibility. A report of this investigation is filed with the
clerk of the court and made available to the court, probation officer, and attorneys for both parties.33 This procedure could be
Report No. 26, op. cit. supra note 7, at 4.
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-2203 (Reissue 1948).
31 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 83-338 (Reissue 1950).
321\Iass. Laws Ann. c. 123, § lOOA (1949).
33 See Glueck, Crime and Correction, 36 Yale L.J. 632 (1927).
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used most effectively by courts following the Durham rule, with
its broad scope of investigation and liberal concept of criminal
responsibility, to place offenders, whose eventual release would
be a danger to society, in mental institutions.
V.

CONCLUSION

It is submitted that the "strict" rule now applied in Nebraska
under the M'Naghten formula does not have the restrictive effect
sought. In use its effect is only to thwart those who seek a valid
insight into the defendant's acts. It is unfair to those whom we
now know scientifically to be mentally ill because it applies an
outworn concept of insanity which may soon be so obsolete as to
violate the Fourteenth Amendment. It is hindering the treatment
of curable cases of mental illness. Finally, it makes it possible
for persons dangerous to society because of mental disease or defects to be released into the population. A more sure method of
dealing with these cases and eliminating the evils now present is
offered in the Durham rule in conjunction with examination procedures similar to those followed in Massachusetts.
Lyman C. Johnson, '56

